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Chapter 1
Introduction
Voting is one of the most basic procedures by which a group of people
with diverse judgments makes a decision. Voting is employed in diverse pro-
cesses in the society. In politics, people select their representatives (president,
members of Parliament) by voting in democratic countries. In judiciary, de-
fendants are judged guilty or innocent by verdicts of juries in some countries.
In management, stockholders decide important matters of their companies
by voting based on their stockholdings in stockholder meetings. Executive
ocers decide some business policies of their companies by voting in boards
of directors. Various forms of social communities (faculty meetings in uni-
versities, communities of residents) decide by voting.
The researchers have studied voting in various elds of social science;
political science, economics, business administration, sociology and so on.
The common issues in these studies are how people behave in group decision
making processes and what property decisions of groups have.
The important function of voting is the aggregation. It aggregates pref-
erences of voters. It also aggregates information of voters. Voting aggregates
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both preferences and information simultaneously in some occasions and it
aggregates only one of them in other occasions. The issue of information
aggregation matters in the following situation. Imagine decision-making in
committees as follows. Suppose that there are two alternatives and that
a committee of 2n + 1 members must decide to choose one of the alterna-
tives. One is better than the other for the committee, but no member of
the committee knows which one is better. However, each committee member
has their own information about which alternative is the better alternative.
Based on this information, he votes and the committee decision is made by
the decision rule. When a member votes for one of the alternatives, the
information which the member holds is transformed into a vote which he
casts. Then, each vote is summed into the total number of votes. Thus, the
information which is scattered at hands of committee members is aggregated
into a single decision of the committee.
The committee can not make a correct decision by voting for sure because
no member knows which is the better alternative. Then, the decision is
more eciently when the probability that the committee chooses the better
alternative is higher. This eciency of decision depends on voting behavior of
committee members, decision rule, and committee size. The important issues
of information aggregation by voting is to understand the voting behavior of
committee members and the eects of decision rule and committee size on
the voting behavior. Then, based on these understandings, how to design
the committees so as to make a decision as much eciently as possible also
becomes an important issue.
There is a well-known classical result on the eciency of voting, called
the Condorcet jury theorem (CJT), established by Condorcet (1785). This
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theorem states that the committees can decide more ecient under the simple
majority rule as the committee size becomes larger (monotonicity CJT) and
that the eciency approaches to the perfect as the committee size becomes
unboundedly large (Limit CJT). The CJT is regarded as the fundamental
achievement of our understanding of democracy, because it provides a rm
rationale for the reasoning that the wisdom of many people is better than an
idea of any genius.
During the last twenty years, some doubt has been cast upon the validity
of the assumptions which the CJT makes. Theoretical economists have began
to study whether the CJT holds or not under an alternative assumption of
strategic voting.
In this dissertation, we study strategic voting and the eciency of deci-
sion in committees in a new perspective to which the research of these two
decades has not paid attention. We introduce an uncertainty of the degree
of information precision, that is, the degrees of information precision are not
the same among the members and the degree of information precision is his
private information. We study two cases, a case of homogenous committee in
terms of members' information precision and a case of heterogenous commit-
tee. In the case of homogenous committee, we show that the the committees
can decide more ecient as the committee size becomes larger as long as
the committee size is suciently large (the monotonicity CJT holds for suf-
ciently large committees). We also show that there exists a case in which
the monotonicity CJT does not hold for small committees. In the case of
heterogenous committee, we show that the Limit CJT holds.
This dissertation is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the
literature in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we study the CJT in the homogenous
3
committees. We study the CJT in the heterogenous committees in Chapters
4 and 5. In Chapter 4, we focus on a case in which the heterogeneity is small.
In Chapter 5, we focus on a case in which the heterogeneity is large.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we review the literature on strategic voting and the
Condorcet jury theorem.
The issue in this literature is the eciency of information aggregation by
voting. The eciency of decision is measured by the probability that the
committee chooses the better alternative. The eciency depends on voting
behavior of committee members, decision rule, and committee size. Using the
framework of strategic voting, economists have studied the voting behavior
in committees and how to design the committees to decide eciently.
For this study, a prototype model of decision-making in committees is as
follows. Suppose that there are two alternatives and that a committee of
2n+1 members must decide to choose one of the alternatives. One is better
than the other for the committee, but no member of the committee knows
which one is better. However, each committee member receives some private
information that conveys which alternative is the better alternative. After
5
receiving the information, they vote and the committee decision is made by
the decision rule.
2.2 Classic Condorcet Jury Theorem
The issue of information aggregation by voting in committees was argued
by Condorcet (1785). (McLean and Hewitt (1994).) Today, his results is
called the classic Condorcet jury theorem. The classic Condorcet jury the-
orem (CJT) states as follows. Assume that the probability that a member
votes for better alternatives are exogenously given and larger than 1=2. As-
sume also that each member's voting probabilities are independent. Then,
the probabilities that the committee decides to choose better alternatives
under the simple majority rule are increasing in n (monotonicity theorem).
Moreover, under the same assumptions, the probabilities go to one as the
committee size goes to innity (limit theorem). This implies that large com-
mittee can decide more eciently than any single person decision.
In spite of the importance of the CJT in our understanding of our so-
ciety, the claim of Condorcet (1785) has not been noticed by economists
until recently, partly because he wrote in French and partly because it was
said that his contribution was not understood appropriately and was not
appreciated by later sociologists in France. When economists began to de-
velop the political economy by using mathematical models in the middle of
the 20th century, Black (1958) discovered the claim of Condorcet (1785).
Then, economists came to pay attentions to the CJT. However, even though
Condorcet (1785) proved his claims mathematically (pp.3-9), his proof of
the theorem has not been widely noted to economists. Several economists
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rather tried to prove the CJT themselves. The monotonicity CJT is proved
by applying the properties of binomial distribution and the Limit CJT is an
application of the law of large numbers. (See Nitzan and Paroush (1985).)
In the classic CJT, it is studied how the eciency of decision depends
on decision rule and the committee size when it is assumed that the voting
behavior is exogenously given. However, in the view of game theory, the
assumption of the voting behavior is suspicious because the voting behavior
is endogenously decided by the player in the strategic situation. Then, it is
also doubtful whether the CJT holds or not. In fact, it is well known today
that the assumptions made in the classic CJT may not hold under strategic
voting.
In 1990's, economists began to study voting behaviors in the framework of
strategic voting; a member considers voting behaviors of the other committee
members and votes to maximize his utility from a committee decision that is
expected under his vote. These studies constitute the literature of strategic
voting.
2.3 Basic Model of Strategic Voting in Com-
mittees and the CJT
In this section, we describe the basic model of strategic voting in com-
mittees and state the earliest and most fundamental results based on this
model.
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2.3.1 The Basic Model
It is Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) that rst analyzed the issue of the
equilibrium of Bayesian voting games. There are two states of the world, A
and B. State A is a state in which alternative A is better than alternative
B for all the members. State B is the opposite. No member knows the true
state. Before each member votes, he receives a signal si 2 fa; bg = S that
conveys information about the state of the world. Member i receives a signal
si = a with probability t or si = b with probability 1   t when the state
is w = A. Similarly, member i receives a signal si = b with probability t
or si = a with probability 1   t when the state is w = B. The probability
t is interpreted as the degree of information precision of member i. It is
assumed that the degree of information precision t is the same for all the
members and t > 1=2. After receiving the signal, the committee members
vote for alternative A or B simultaneously. A decision d 2 fA;Bg is made
by the simple majority rule. After the decision, each member receives payo
depending on the decision and the state. It is assumed that the utility from
choosing the better alternative is the same between the states A and B and
normalized to 1, and the utility from choosing the worse alternative is the
same between states and normalized to 0. Then, the utility function is as
follows;
u(d = Ajw = A) = u(d = Bjw = B) = 1
and
u(d = Bjw = A) = u(d = Ajw = B) = 0:
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2.3.2 Voting Behavior in Equilibrium and the CJT
Two natural voting behaviors are conceivable in this voting game. The
rst is the sincere voting. This behavior means that a committee member
votes for A if and only if his expected utility from committee decision A under
the posterior belief given his signal is larger than his utility from committee
decision B. The sincere voting is intuitive because it is optimal to choose an
alternative based on his own information when he decides for himself.
The second is the informative voting. It is a voting behavior as follows.
A committee member votes for A if he receives the signal si = a and he votes
for B if he receives the signal si = b. Under the simple majority rule, it is
natural to aggregate the signals received by the committee members directly.
Moreover, if a committee member takes the informative voting behavior, the
probabilities that he votes for the better alternatives on each states are larger
than 1=2. Then, if all committee members take the informative voting, the
Limit CJT holds.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) examined whether these two behaviors
constitute an equilibrium. They showed that the informative voting is the
sincere voting and it constitute an equilibrium in the voting game only under
some restricted condition. In generic cases, the sincere voting is neither an
informative voting nor an equilibrium behavior. This is because in addition
to his signal, a committee member uses in equilibrium the information that
he is pivotal, that is, the n members vote for A and the other n member votes
for B. His vote aects the committee decision if and only if he is pivotal. In
this situation, the committee decision is d = A if he votes for A and d = B if
he votes for B. On the other hand, his vote does not change the committee
decision if he is not pivotal. When he is pivotal, this additional information
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updates his posterior. Then, the sincere voting will not be a best response
generically.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) did not show what is the equilibrium
voting behavior. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) explicitly stated the con-
dition for an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the model of Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996). They showed by considering this condition that the Limit
CJT holds under the simple majority rule. They also showed that the CJT
holds under other majority rules and the CJT does not hold under the una-
nimity rule in this model. This is the earliest and most fundamental results
on the CJT under strategic voting.
2.4 Extended Models
In the basic model, three important assumptions were made. They are
the assumptions about information structure, procedures of decision-making,
and common preferences. In this section, we review studies that followed
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and examined whether the CJT holds or
not without these assumptions.
2.4.1 Information Structure
In the basic model, it is assumed that each member receives binary signal
with common information precision. There are some extended models about
information structures. One is a continuous signal model. It is an extended
model in which the signal space is continuous. Another extension is a costly
information acquisition model. While an information system about the true
state is given in the basic model, this model describe the process by which a
10
committee member is endowed with the information about the state.
(1-a) Continuous Signal
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and Meirowitz (2002) studied continuous
signal models. They assume that each member receives a signal realized in
a compact interval according to a continuous density. They showed that the
Limit CJT also holds in these extended signal models and that the Limit
CJT holds not only in the majority rules but also the unanimity rule if the
likelihood ratio of the signal distribution is unbounded. Their result means
that the Feddersen and Pesendorfer's result on majority rules is robust with
respect to signal space. On the other hand, their negative result on the
unanimity rule depends on the specic property of the binary signal model
that it does not satisfy the unboundedness of the likelihood ratio of the signal
distribution.
(1-b) Costly Information Acquisition
In the costly information acquisition model, each member chooses to ac-
quire the information or not. If he acquires the information, he pays the
cost and receives a signal. He has no information about the state when he
does not acquire the information. Mukhopadhaya (2003) considered then
simple majority rule and showed a case in which large committees can not
decide more eciently than small committees for some parameters, that is,
the monotonicity theorem does not hold. The members in the large commit-
tees has incentive to free-ride on the other members' information acquisition.
Persico (2004) analyzed the optimal voting rule in terms of the fraction of
the necessary votes in the total number of voters under costly information
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acquisition. Koriyama and Szentes (2009) analyzed the optimal committee
size under costly information acquisition. They showed that the optimal
committee size n is bounded, and that any oversized committee beyond n
is inferior than the optimal committee only slightly in the sense that it can
decide more eciently than the size of n   2.
2.4.2 Procedures of Decision-making
In the basic model, three particular features in a procedure for decision-
making are assumed. First, a member is not allowed to abstain. Second,
a member is not allowed to communicate. Third, all the members must
vote simultaneously. In this section, we review studies that considered other
procedures of decision-making in committees: strategic abstention, commu-
nication before voting, and sequential voting.
(2-a) Strategic Abstention
In the basic model, it is assumed that the degrees of information preci-
sion are the same for all members. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) studied
strategic abstention. They introduced the uncertainty of the degrees of in-
formation precision in an election model. Let ti denote member i's degree of
information precision. In their model, there are two types of the degree of
information precision. One is that the degree of information precision is per-
fect, that is, ti = 1. The other one is that the degree of information precision
is null, that is, ti = 1=2. It is assumed that the degree of the information
precision is his private information. They showed that the perfect informa-
tion type members take the informative voting and the null information type
members choose abstain.
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McMurray (2013) extended their model. He studied a model in which
the degree of information precision is continuously distributed on the inter-
val from 1/2 to 1. He showed that a member takes the informative voting
when his information precision is above the cuto and a member chooses
abstain when his information precision is below the cuto. In his model, the
information of the less informed members is ignored. Then, the committee
with more members can decide more eciently than or at least as eciently
as the committee with less members. That is, the monotonicity CJT holds.
(2-b) Communication
Coughlan (2000) studied the role of communication before voting. He
considered a two stage voting in which all the members simultaneously vote
in the preliminary voting, they observe the result of the preliminary voting,
and they vote to decide the committee decision. He showed that the sincere
revelation strategy constitutes an equilibrium in the preliminary voting stage
under some conditions. Coughlan (2000) showed that the committee can
decide eciently under the unanimity rule. This result contrast with the
negative result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) that the CJT does not
hold under the unanimity rule.
(2-c) Sequential Voting
In the basic model, each member votes simultaneously. When the voting
is sequential, the later voter can use the information of earlier voting. Dekel
and Piccione (2001) studied sequential voting. In their model, the order of
voters is exogenously given. They showed that there exists an equilibrium
in the sequential voting that supports the outcome of the equilibrium of
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simultaneous voting game. In this equilibrium, each member votes according
to his private information and previous votes under the condition that he
is pivotal. This voting behavior is consistent with the voting behavior in
the simultaneous voting that depends on his private information under the
condition that he is pivotal. Their result means that the eciency of decision
under sequential voting is at least as good as that under the simultaneous
voting.
In contrast with Dekel and Piccione (2001), Rokas and Tripathi (2008)
studied endogenous sequential voting. In the endogenous sequential voting
model, each member can choose the timing of his vote. Rokas and Tripathi
(2008) showed that the committee can achieve the ex-post optimal decision
if there are suciently many chances to vote. This implies that both of
the monotonicity theorem and the limit theorem hold under the endogenous
sequential voting.
Rokas and Tripathi (2008) considered a particular algorithm to achieve
the ex-post optimal decision in the endogenous sequential voting. Nagaoka
and Suehiro (2013) showed that the ex-post optimal decision can be sup-
ported in a wider class of algorithms.
2.4.3 Conicts of Interests
In the basic model, it is assumed that each member has the same pref-
erences. That is, there are no conict among the members. There are some
alternative approaches to relax this assumption. One is to allow the conict-
ing preferences over the decision. Another one is to introduce the reputation
concern preferences.
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(3-a) Conicting Preferences
Feddesen and Pesendorfer (1997) consider a case in which each member
may have dierent preferences over the decision than the other members.
They analyzed a voting game in which each member's payo depends on
the state, the committee's decision and his preference type. They showed
that the fraction of voters who take informative action goes to zero as the
committee size goes to innity. In the equilibrium, the full information equiv-
alence occurs, that is, the decision would not change with almost probability
one even if all the private information were common knowledge under some
assumptions.
(3-b) Reputation Concern
A member is said to have reputation concern preferences when he would
like to show that his degree of information precision is high. It is easily
imagined that reputation concern preferences may distort the information
aggregation by voting in committees.
Levy (2004) studied the decision-making by an individual with reputation
concern preferences. She showed that the reputation concerned individual
has an incentive to deviate from the sincere decision. Levy (2007) consid-
ered the simultaneous voting by reputation concerned members in which the
evaluator of the voters observe each vote and the true state. The equilibrium
behavior in this voting game becomes identical with the one in Levy (2004).
Ottaviani and Srensen (2001) analyzed the sequential voting under the
assumption of the reputation concerns. They showed that the later voter
has an incentive to take a herding behavior. They also analyzed the optimal
order of voting.
15
2.5 The Relationship between This Study and
the Literature
We study two issues on the strategic voting and the CJT in this disser-
tation.
The rst is whether the monotonicity theorem holds or not under the
strategic voting. The previous studies on the strategic voting focused on the
limit theorem and they did not argue the monotonicity theorem. Our study
is the rst attempt to study the monotonicity theorem under the strategic
voting. We show two results on this issue. One is that the monotonicity
theorem holds under strategic voting for suciently large committees. The
other one is that there exists a case in which the monotonicity theorem does
not hold for a small committee.
The second issue in our studies is whether the CJT holds or not under
the heterogeneity of the committee members. In the previous studies, it was
assumed that the information system of each member is homogeneous, that
is, each member is identical in his ability to receive his information about the
state of the world. However, it is common in the real world that members'
information systems are heterogeneous. For example, some members are pro-
fessional and some members are amateur on the problem for the committee
to decide. Under the heterogeneity of information systems, it is naturally ex-
pected that the voting behaviors are complexed under the strategic voting.
Therefore, it remains unclear whether this complexity disturbs the claims of
the CJT.
We study the strategic voting in a committee with the members who
have heterogeneity of information systems. We consider two extreme cases
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in which heterogeneity of information systems prevails among the committee
members.
One is a case in which the heterogeneity is small in the sense that almost
all members are identical in their information systems and only one member
diers from the rest of the members. We show that in this case, the voting
behavior in equilibrium converges to informative voting. When there are no
heterogeneity, the voting behavior in equilibrium under the simple majority
rule converges to the informative voting. The result for the committee with
small heterogeneity is consistent with the fact for the homogenous committee.
Then, the limit CJT holds for the committee with small heterogeneity.
The other one is a case in which the heterogeneity is large in the sense
that there are two large sub-groups in the committee and the information
systems of the members in one sub-group are dierent from those in the
other sub-group, while members in the same sub-group are identical in their
information systems. We show that in this case, the voting behavior in
equilibrium may not converge to the informative voting. However, we also
show that the limit CJT still holds.
To study these issues, we consider the uncertainty about member's infor-
mation precision. That is, a member's degree of information precision is a
realization of a continuous random variable and a realized degree of infor-
mation precision is his private information. Our model is regarded as an ex-
tension of the basic model of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998) with binary signals to the model with continuous
signals.
Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and Meirowitz (2002) also studied the
strategic voting by using continuous signal models. Their models are simi-
17
lar to our model. Our model can be transformed to their continuous signal
models. Our model has several advantages over them in the study of the
CJT. One is that we can understand the voting behavior in equilibrium and
its properties more intuitively in our signal models than in their abstract
signal models. Another advantage is that we can dene the heterogeneity
of information systems among the members by natural way in our signal
model. In the above mentioned real world situation, we can describe the
professional members' distribution and the amateur members' distribution
by using stochastic ordering of distributions.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Voting and Condorcet
Jury Theorem under
Uncertainty about Player's
Information Precision
3.1 Introduction
Voting is one of the most basic procedures by which a group of people
with diverse judgments makes a decision. The question is how eciently vot-
ing aggregates individual judgments. There is a well-known classical result,
called the Condorcet jury theorem (CJT), established by Condorcet (1785).
This theorem states the following. Suppose that there are two alternatives
and that a committee of 2n + 1 members must decide to choose one of the
alternatives. One is better than the other for the committee, but no member
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of the committee knows which one is better. Assume that the probability
that a member votes for better alternatives are exogenously given and larger
than 1=2. Then, the probabilities that the committee decides to choose bet-
ter alternatives under the simple majority rule are increasing in n.1 The CJT
provides an important implication for the committee design problem. When
a group of individuals organizes a committee by selecting its members from
the group and lets the committee make a decision for the group, the best is
achieved if all the individuals of the group join the committee.
Today, it is well known that the assumptions made in the CJT may not
hold under strategic voting; a member votes to maximize his utility from
a committee decision that is expected under his vote. The purpose of this
chapter is to reexamine the issue of the relation between the expected utility
and the number of committee members when they vote strategically.
The voting game that we analyze is as follows. There are two states that
represent which is the better alternative. Each committee member receives a
signal. After receiving the signal, they vote simultaneously. The committee
decision is made by the simple majority rule. In this model, we assume that
a member receives a signal with some precision. The information precision
of a voter is determined randomly. Then, the voter receives a binary signal
about the better alternative with his information precision. We assume that
the information precision and the signal become his private information.
We study the symmetric responsive equilibrium in this Bayesian voting
game. We establish three results. First, we provide a sucient condition for
welfare monotonicity. Second, we give an example in which adding members
1Under the same assumptions, Condorcet also showed that the probabilities go to one
as the committee size goes to innity.
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to the committee does not improve welfare in a small committee. The eect of
adding the members to the committee depends on a probability distribution
of information precision and the parameters of the game. Finally, we show
that the CJT holds for suciently large committees, that is, the probability
that the committee selects the better alternative under the simple majority
rule is increasing in n for all n large enough.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we explain our model.
In Section 3, we show that there exists a symmetric responsive equilibrium
and it is characterized by a cuto strategy. Section 4 presents the welfare
analysis. Section 5 discusses the welfare in the limit as n goes to innity.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
3.1.1 Related Literature
There is another claim known as the Condorcet jury theorem. It is the
Limit Condorcet jury theorem (Limit CJT). It claims that the probability
that the committee decides to choose the better alternative goes to one as the
committee size goes to innity. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) studied
whether the Limit CJT holds under strategic voting. They analyzed a voting
game in which each voter receives a binary signal. They calculated the sym-
metric mixed strategy equilibrium of this game and showed that the Limit
CJT holds for any voting rule except unanimity rules.2 They assumed that
the degree of information precision is exogenously given and the same for all
voters and that the degree of precision is common knowledge. We introduce
2The basic result by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) was followed by many studies
that examine strategic voting and the Limit CJT. Gerling et al. (2005) and Li and Suen
(2009) provide an overview of this literature.
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an uncertainty about the degree of information precision. Our model allows
a situation in which some members may have more precise information than
other members. The cuto strategy equilibrium in our model is related to
the mixed strategy equilibrium in the Feddersen and Pesendorfer model. In
the Feddersen and Pesendorfer model, a voter mixes his vote between two
alternatives when he receives a particular signal. In our model, given a par-
ticular signal, a voter votes for an alternative when his information precision
is above a certain cuto point and votes for the other alternative when the
information precision is below the cuto point. We can interpret this cuto
strategy in our model as a purication of the mixed strategy in the Feddersen
and Pesendorfer model.
This chapter is closely related to Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and
Meirowitz (2002). They constructed a continuous signal model. They showed
that there exists a symmetric cuto equilibrium and that the Limit CJT holds
for majority rules. They also showed that the Limit CJT holds for unanimity
rules if and only if there exists a strong signal.
Meirowitz (2002) also studied a similar continuous signal model and
showed the Limit CJT. Then, he pointed out that this Limit CJT implies that
the decision-making by n-members committee is more ecient than a sin-
gle person decision-making for suciently large n. Furthermore, Meirowitz
(2002) claimed to show an example in which the eciency of decision-making
by three-member committee is less ecient than a single person decision-
making.
In contrast with them, we consider the relation between the expected
utility and the number of committee members. Furthermore, we point out
that the example of Meirowitz (2002) seems to have a aw. We provide an
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example in which the decision-making by a larger committee is not necessarily
more ecient than the decision-making by a smaller committee.
McMurray (2013) is an important study related to this chapter. His model
is a continuous model of strategic abstention of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996). He constructed a continuous information precision model with an
option that the voter can choose abstention. He showed that a voter who
is uninformed chooses to abstain and a voter who has precise information
votes according to his signal. This model can be interpreted as an election
model. In contrast, we consider a committee model in which the committee
members are not allowed to abstain.
3.2 Model
We consider a 2n+1 member committee. The committee chooses between
alternatives A and B. The members have the same preferences over the
alternatives, depending on the state of the world. There are two states of
the world, A and B. State A is a state in which alternative A is better than
alternative B for all the members. State B is the opposite. Let d 2 fA;Bg
denote a committee's decision and w 2 fA;Bg denote a state of the world.
Then, the utility function is as follows: u(d = Ajw = A) = u(d = Bjw =
B) = 0; u(d = Ajw = B) =  c; u(d = Bjw = A) =  (1  c): We assume that
the utility from choosing the better alternative is the same between state A
and state B and normalized to 0. The parameter c represents a utility loss
from choosing an alternative A when the state is B. Similarly, the parameter
1  c represents a utility loss from choosing an alternative B when the state
is A.
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The committee decision is made by voting by the committee members.
The voting rule is the simple majority rule. Each member votes for alterna-
tive A or B.3 The committee decision is d = A if and only if at least n + 1
members vote for A.
No member knows the true state. Before each member votes, however,
he receives a signal s 2 fa; bg = S that conveys information about the
state of the world. Member i receives a signal si = a with probability ti or
si = b with probability 1  ti when the state is w = A. Similarly, member i
receives a signal si = b with probability ti or si = a with probability 1   ti
when the state is w = B. The probability ti is interpreted as the degree of
information precision of member i. The degree of information precision ti is
private information of member i. The degree of information precision ti is
distributed on [1=2; 1] = T with a full support density f for all i. Thus, each
member has two kinds of private information, the signal si and the degree of
information precision ti. The signal si is realized independently across the
members given the state. The degree of information precision ti is realized
independently across the members and the states.
The timing of the game is as follows. A state w 2 fA;Bg is realized with
probability Pr(w). We denote Pr(B) = q > 1=2. Each committee member
i is endowed with his information precision ti 2 [1=2; 1] according to the
density f . Then, each committee member i receives a signal si 2 fa; bg.
Then, the committee members vote for alternative A or B simultaneously.
A decision d 2 fA;Bg is made by the simple majority rule. The members
receive utilities depending on the decision made and the state realized.
3The members are not allowed to choose abstention.
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3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
A committee member has private information (s; t) 2 S  T . A (pure)
strategy of member i is a function mi : ST ! fA;Bg. We consider strate-
gies such that the member changes his vote according to his information. We
call them responsive strategies. They are formally dened as follows.
Denition 3.1 (responsive strategy). The strategy is responsive if there exist
(s; t) and (s0; t0) such that mi(s; t) 6= mi(s0; t0) and the sets f(s; t)jmi(s; t) =
Ag and f(s; t)jmi(s; t) = Bg have positive measures.
Let A = Pr(m = Ajw = A) and B = Pr(m = Bjw = B) denote the
voting probability that a member votes for the better alternative given the
state. Then, the voting probabilities A and B under a responsive strategy
are 0 < A; B < 1. To see this, let Pr(s; tjA) and Pr(s; tjB) denote the
joint probability distribution of (s; t) given the state. Note that Pr(s; tjA)
and Pr(s; tjB) are (almost everywhere) full support because f is full support.
Then, the voting probabilities for each alternative are
Pr(m = A) =
Z
(s;t)2f(s;t)jmi(s;t)=Ag
Pr(A) Pr(s; tjA)dsdt
+
Z
(s;t)2f(s;t)jmi(s;t)=Ag
Pr(B) Pr(s; tjB)dsdt
= Pr(A)A + Pr(B)(1  B)
Pr(m = B) =
Z
(s;t)2f(s;t)jmi(s;t)=Bg
Pr(A) Pr(s; tjA)dsdt
+
Z
(s;t)2f(s;t)jmi(s;t)=Bg
Pr(B) Pr(s; tjB)dsdt
= Pr(A)(1  A) + Pr(B)B:
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Suppose A = 0, that isZ
(s;t)2f(s;t)jmi(s;t)=Ag
Pr(s; tjA)dsdt = 0:
This implies that the set f(s; t)jmi(s; t) = Ag has a zero measure because
Pr(s; tjA) is full support. Then,Z
(s;t)2f(s;t)jmi(s;t)=Ag
Pr(s; tjB)dsdt = 0:
This implies Pr(m = A) = 0. This is a contradiction to the denition of a
responsive strategy and, therefore A > 0. Similarly, B > 0 and A; B < 1.
We analyze the symmetric equilibrium in responsive strategies, in which
all the members use the same responsive strategy. First, we consider the best
response to responsive strategies. The condition by which a voter who has
private information (s; t) weakly prefers voting for A to voting for B is that
the expected utility from voting for A is more than or equal to the expected
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utility from voting for B. That is,
Pr(A) Pr(s; tjA)  [fPr(more than n+ 1 voters vote for AjA)
+Pr(n voters vote for AjA)gu(AjA)
+fPr(fewer than n  1 voters vote for AjA)gu(BjA)]
+Pr(B) Pr(s; tjB)  [fPr(more than n+ 1 voters vote for AjB)
+Pr(n voters vote for AjB)gu(AjB)
+fPr(fewer than n  1 voters vote for AjB)gu(BjB)]
 Pr(A) Pr(s; tjA)  [fPr(more than n+ 1 voters vote for AjA)gu(AjA)
+fPr(n voters vote for AjA)
+Pr(fewer than n  1 voters vote for AjA)gu(BjA)]
+Pr(B) Pr(s; tjB)  [fPr(more than n+ 1 voters vote for AjB)gu(AjB)
+fPr(n voters vote for AjB)
+Pr(fewer than n  1 voters vote for AjB)gu(BjB)]:
Let piv denote an event in which a member is pivotal, that is, n voters vote
for A. Then, the condition is arranged as follows.
Pr(A) Pr(s; tjA) Pr(pivjA)
Pr(B) Pr(s; tjB) Pr(pivjB) 
u(AjB)
u(BjA) (3.1)
In particular, the indierence condition is
Pr(w = Ajs; t)
Pr(w = Bjs; t)
Pr(pivjA)
Pr(pivjB) =
u(AjB)
u(BjA) : (3.2)
We show that the best response is a cuto strategy if the other members use
responsive strategies.
Denition 3.2 (cuto strategy). A strategy is a cuto strategy if there exists
a cuto point (s; t) such that m(s; t) = A if and only if Pr(w = Ajs; t) 
Pr(w = Ajs; t).
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Lemma 3.1. A best response to responsive strategies must be a cuto strat-
egy.
Proof. The indierence condition (3.2) is rearranged to
Pr(w = Ajs; t)
Pr(w = Bjs; t) =
Pr(pivjB)u(AjB)
Pr(pivjA)u(BjA) : (3.3)
The right-hand side of (3.3) is nite and positive because we consider respon-
sive strategies. The left-hand side of (3.3) is the ratio of the posterior belief
given his information (s; t), which is
Pr(w = Ajs; t)
Pr(w = Bjs; t) =
8<:
(1 q)
q
t
(1 t) for s = a
(1 q)
q
(1 t)
t
for s = b
: (3.4)
For s = a, this ratio is increasing in t and goes to innity as t goes to 1. For
s = b, this ratio is decreasing in t and goes to 0 as t goes to 1. Note that
the ratio is (1   q)=q at t = 1=2 for s = a and s = b. Therefore, the ratio
is continuous. Hence, there exists a unique (s; t) such that equation (3.3)
holds. Then,
Pr(w = Ajs; t)
Pr(w = Bjs; t) 
Pr(pivjB)u(AjB)
Pr(pivjA)u(BjA)
for (s; t) such that Pr(w = Ajs; t)  Pr(w = Ajs; t). This means that the
best response must be a cuto strategy.
By Lemma 3.1, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium in cuto strate-
gies. Let (s; t) be a cuto point in a cuto strategy. Then, the voting
probabilities given the states by the cuto strategy is as follows. If the cuto
point signal is s = a, a member votes for A if and only if s = a and t  t.
Therefore,
A =
Z 1
t
tf(t)dt
B = 1 
Z 1
t
(1  t)f(t)dt:
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Similarly, if the cuto point signal is s = b,
A = 1 
Z 1
t
(1  t)f(t)dt
B =
Z 1
t
tf(t)dt:
With these probabilities, the indierence condition (3.2) is written as follows.
Pr(w = Ajs; t)
Pr(w = Bjs; t)
nA
(1  B)n
(1  A)n
nB
=
u(d = Ajw = B)
u(d = Bjw = A) (3.5)
In the next theorem, we prove the unique existence of cut point (s; t) that
satises condition (3.5).
Theorem 3.1. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in responsive
strategies characterized by a cuto strategy with cuto point (s; t).
Proof. To consider symmetric equilibrium, let  = t = t on the left-hand
side of (3.5). The rst term on the left-hand side of (3.5) is the ratio of
posterior belief (3.4). We have already shown in the proof of Lemma 3.1
that it is continuous and monotonic in  , it goes to innity as  goes to 1 for
s = a, and it goes to 0 as  goes to 1 for s = b. We show that the second
term 
A
1  B
n
1  A
B
n
on the left-hand side of (3.5) has the same properties.
Consider the case of s = a. Then,
A
1  B
is obviously continuous in  . It is increasing in  because
d
d
R 1

tf(t)dtR 1

(1  t)f(t)dt =
f()
R 1

(t  )f(t)dtR 1

(1  t)f(t)dt
2 > 0:
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Finally, by L'Hospital's rule, we have
lim
!1
R 1

tf(t)dtR 1

(1  t)f(t)dt = lim!1
 f()
 (1  )f() =1:
Similarly,
1  A
B
is continuous in  . It is increasing in  because
d
d
1  R 1

tf(t)dt
1  R 1

(1  t)f(t)dt =
(2   1)f() + f() R 1

(t  )f(t)dt
1  R 1

(1  t)f(t)dt
2 > 0:
Finally, we have
lim
!1
1  R 1

tf(t)dt
1  R 1

(1  t)f(t)dt = 1:
Hence, the second term on the left-hand side of (3.5), that is,
A
1  B
n
1  A
B
n
is continuous and increasing in  , and it goes to innity as  goes to 1 for
s = a.
For the case of s = b, an analogous argument establishes that the second
term of (3.5) is continuous and decreasing in  , and it goes to 0 as  goes to
1.
Note that A = B = E[t] at  = 1=2 for s = a and s = b. Therefore, the
second term of (3.5) is 1 at  = 1=2 for s = a and s = b.
Hence, the left-hand side of (3.5) is continuous and monotone in  , and
it goes to 1 as  goes to 1 for s = a and goes to 0 as  goes to 1 for s = b.
Therefore, there exists a unique (s; t) such that (3.5) holds.
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The intuition of Theorem 3.1 is as follows. Suppose that every member
uses the same cuto strategy. If the cuto point signal is s = a and t is
large enough, a member who has the threshold degree of precision t should
not be indierent between voting for A and voting for B, because he believes
with a high probability that the state is w = A. First, the received signal
s = a indicates that the state is w = A with a high probability, because
he receives the signal under the high precision t. Second, the event that
he is pivotal conveys information from which he believes that the state is
w = A. The members vote for A when they receive the signal s = a and t
is large enough. Therefore, when the state is w = B, the probability that a
member votes for A is very small, because a member with a large t receives
the signal s = b with a high probability. Hence, when the state is w = B, the
probability that he is pivotal is small. From this information, he believes with
a high probability that the state is w = A, and he votes for A. Therefore, a
large t is not an equilibrium. Similarly, if the cuto point signal is s = b
and t is large enough, a member who has the threshold degree of precision
t should not be indierent between voting for A and voting for B. Both the
ratio of posterior beliefs and the ratio of probabilities that he is pivotal given
the states are continuous and monotonic. Therefore, there exists a unique
equilibrium.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the committee size
and the ex ante expected utility from the symmetric equilibrium in responsive
strategies.
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The classical result is the CJT. Suppose that the voting probabilities for
the better alternative given the state are exogenously given and xed. Then,
if the voting probabilities are larger than 1=2, the following holds about the
probabilities that the committee chooses better alternatives given the states.
Proposition 3.1 (CJT). Suppose that A and B are exogenously given and
xed for n. If A; B > 1=2, then
1. Pr(d = Ajw = A) and Pr(d = Bjw = B) are monotonically increasing
in n,
2. Pr(d = Ajw = A) and Pr(d = Bjw = B) go to 1 as n goes to innity.
CJT implies that the expected utility
E2n+1[u] = Pr(A) Pr(d = BjA)u(BjA) + Pr(B) Pr(d = AjB)u(AjB)
is increasing in n and goes to 0 as n!1 if A and B are exogenously given
and larger than 1=2.
3.4.1 A Suciency Theorem for Welfare Monotonicity
To provide a sucient condition for welfare monotonicity, we rst consider
a relation between the committee size and the cuto point in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.2. t is decreasing in n.
Proof. We have shown that the left-hand side of (3.5) is increasing in t for
s = a and decreasing in t for s = b. The left-hand side of (3.5) is increasing
in n for s = a and decreasing in n for s = b because
A(1  A)
(1  B)B
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is 1 when t = 1=2 and increasing (decreasing) in t for s = a (s = b).
Therefore, t is decreasing in n.
The indierence condition (3.5) is arranged as follows.
Pr(sjw = A; t)
Pr(sjw = B; t)
Pr(pivjw = A)
Pr(pivjw = B) =
q
1  q
c
1  c: (3.6)
Let  = q
1 q
c
1 c . The next lemma states a relation between  and the cuto
point (s; t).
Lemma 3.3. The cuto point (s; t) satises the following properties.
 If  > 1, the cuto point (s; t) satises s = a and t 2 (1=2; 1).
Furthermore, t is increasing in  and goes to 1 as  goes to innity.
 If  < 1, the cuto point (s; t) satises s = b and t 2 (1=2; 1).
Furthermore, t is decreasing in  and goes to 1 as  goes to 0.
 If  = 1, the cuto point (s; t) satises s = a = b and t = 1=2.
Proof. The rst term of the left-hand side of (3.6) is
Pr(sjw = A; t)
Pr(sjw = B; t) =
8<: t1 t if s = a1 t
t
if s = b
:
This is increasing in t if s = a and decreasing in t if s = b, and equal to 1 if
t = 1=2. We have shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that the second term
of the left-hand side of (3.6),
Pr(pivjw = A)
Pr(pivjw = B) =

A(1  A)
(1  B)B
n
;
is increasing in t if s = a and decreasing in t if s = b, and equal to 1 if
t = 1=2. Therefore, if  > 1, s = a and t is increasing in . If  < 1, s = b
and t is decreasing in . If  = 1, t = 1=2.
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Finally, we have shown in the proof of Theorem 3.1 that the left-hand
side of (3.6) goes to innity as t goes to 1 for s = a and goes to 0 as t goes
to 1 for s = b. Therefore, t goes to 1 as  goes to innity and t goes to 1 as
 goes to 0.
With this lemma, we can establish the following relation between  and
the voting probabilities in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.4. The voting probability A is decreasing in , lim!0 A = 1,
lim!1 A = 0, and A = E[t] at  = 1. The voting probability B is
increasing in , lim!0 B = 0, lim!1 B = 1, and B = E[t] at  = 1.
Proof. We consider a case of  > 1. From Lemma 3.3, s = a. Furthermore,
A is decreasing in  because t
 is increasing in  and A is decreasing in
t for s = a. We have shown in Lemma 3.3 that t goes to 1 as  goes to
innity. Obviously, A goes to 0 as t
 goes to 1 for s = a. Therefore, A
goes to 0 as  goes to innity. The rest of Lemma 3.4 is proved similarly.
By this lemma, there exists a unique  for which A = 1=2. We call it
. Similarly,  is a unique  for which B = 1=2. We know from Lemma 3.4
that  < 1 < . These  are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
These thresholds  and  depend on n, because t depends on n in equa-
tion (3.6) and, hence the voting probabilities A and B depend on n. To
be explicit about this fact, let us denote the thresholds as (n) and (n). In
the next theorem, we show the sucient condition under which the expected
utilities from equilibrium strategic voting in committees with dierent sizes
can be compared.
Theorem 3.2 (a sucient condition for welfare monotonicity). Take any n
and n0 such that n < n0. If  2 [(n); (n)], then E2n+1[u] < E2n0+1[u].
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A; B
1  0
A
B
Figure 3.1:  and 
Proof. Suppose  2 [(n); (n)]. Let A(n) and B(n) denote the voting
probabilities in the equilibrium in a committee with size 2n+1. Then, Lemma
3.4 guarantees that A(n)  1=2 and B(n)  1=2 hold where at least one
inequality must be strict. By CJT, we know that if these voting probabilities
A(n) and B(n) apply in a committee of size 2n
0 + 1, then the expected
utilities for the committee are higher than for a committee of size 2n + 1.
Then, we compare the expected utility under the voting probabilities A(n)
and B(n) with the expected utility from equilibrium strategic voting in a
committee with size 2n0 + 1. In this voting game, every committee member
has an identical utility function. Then, a symmetric responsive strategy that
maximizes the expected utility is a symmetric responsive equilibrium (see
McLenan (1998)). By Theorem 3.1, the symmetric equilibrium in responsive
strategies is unique. Therefore, a symmetric strategy that maximizes the
expected utility is unique and that is the unique symmetric responsive equi-
librium. Hence, the expected utility in equilibrium is weakly larger than an
expected utility from any symmetric responsive strategy. The voting prob-
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abilities A(n) and B(n) are generated by a symmetric responsive strategy.
Hence, the expected utility from equilibrium strategic voting is weakly larger
than the expected utility under the voting probabilities A(n) and B(n) in
a committee of size 2n0 + 1. This establishes E2n+1[u] < E2n0+1[u].
3.4.2 Small Committee
We consider the case in which  =2 [(n); (n)]. In this case, the eect
of adding members to the committee is not clear. We present two examples
that show its eect in opposite directions.
Uniform Distribution Model
Let f be a uniform distribution and suppose c = 1   c = 1=2. We
consider a one-member committee and a three-member committee. Let t(1)
and t(3) be the cuto points in equilibrium in each committee. Note that
s = a and t(1) = q. For suciently large q, A(1) < 1=2, so that we can
not apply Theorem 3.2 with n = 0 and n0 = 1. However, we can check that
E3[u]  E1[u] is positive for any q 2 [1=2; 1].4
4Meirowitz (2002) analyzed the eciency of decision between the one-member com-
mittee and the three-member committee. He considered the continuous signal model.
Each member receives the signal xi 2 [0; 1] with conditional probability density functions
g(xijA) and g(xijB). He considered an example in which the prior is q = 0:7 and the signal
distributions are g(xijA) = 2xi and g(xijB) = 2(1  xi). He claimed that in this example,
the eciency of decision-making by three-member committee is less ecient than a single
person decision-making.
However, it seems that this claim is not true. To see it, note that our uniform dis-
tribution model corresponds to the example of Meirowitz (2002) through the following
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Figure 3.2: E3[u]  E1[u] for q 2 [1=2; 1] under the uniform distribution
Bimodal Distribution Model
In this example, we consider a bimodal distribution in which probability
is concentrated around t = 1=2 and t = 1. Consider the following distri-
transformation. Consider a function  : (si; ti)! [0; 1] such that
(si; ti) =
8<: 1  ti if si = ati if si = b
and let xi = (si; ti). When the probability density function of ti is uniform distribution,
the probability density function of xi induced by the transformation  coincides with the
above example.
In our model, we showed in Figure 2 that E3[u]  E1[u] is positive for any q 2 [1=2; 1].
Particularly, at q = 0:7, the eciency of decision-making by three-member committee is
more ecient than a single person decision-making. Meirowitz (2002) seems to have a
aw.
In the following subsection, we present a bimodal distribution model and show that in
this model, the eciency of decision-making by three-member committee is less ecient
than a single person decision-making.
37
bution model as an extreme case of such a distribution. Suppose that the
distribution of t is discrete and Pr(t = 1) = p and Pr(t = 1=2) = 1   p.
Moreover, suppose c = 1   c = 1=2. The equilibrium in this discrete model
is as follows. A member who has t = 1 votes according to his signal. A
member who has t = 1=2 votes for A with probability . This probability is
determined by
Pr(A)
Pr(B)
Pr(pivjA)
Pr(pivjB) = 1:
This equation corresponds to the indierence condition (3:6) of the continu-
ous model.
The next graph shows E3[u] E1[u] with p = 1=10. We see E3[u] E1[u] <
0 for large q.
Figure 3.3: E3[u]  E1[u] for q 2 [1=2; 1] under a discrete distribution
The intuition of this example is as follows. Consider a one-member com-
mittee. When the member has t = 1=2, adding two members to the commit-
tee brings him a higher expected utility, because the added members may
38
have perfect information (t = 1) about the true state with positive probabili-
ties and the information is reected in the committee decision in equilibrium.
On the other hand, when the member has t = 1, adding two members brings
him a lower expected utility. He chooses a better alternative with probability
1 in the one-member committee. However, the three-member committee can
not choose a better alternative with probability 1, because the added mem-
bers may have no information (t = 1=2) about the true state and vote for an
inferior alternative with positive probabilities. The net eect of adding two
members depends on the distribution of the degree of information precision
t. For the case of p = 1=10, the second eect is dominant for large q in
which a member with t = 1=2 votes for B with a high probability in the
three-member committee.
Finally, let us examine the behavior of the expected utility for a wider
range of committee sizes. Let us choose the prior q = 3=4 in the above discrete
model. The following table (Table 1) presents the results from 2n+1 = 1 to
2n+ 1 = 61. The next graph (Figure 4) illustrates the relation between the
committee size and the expected utility in the equilibrium. It shows that the
expected utility is decreased not only between 1 and 3 (in Figure 3) but also
between 3 and 5. However, it is monotonically increasing for 2n+ 1 > 5.
The gure (Figure 4) also illustrates Theorem 2. The table shows that
A is monotonically increasing and A is larger than 1=2 for 2n+1  55. Ac-
cording to Theorem 2, the expected utility must be monotonically increasing
for 2n+ 1  55.
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Figure 3.4: committee size and expected utility
3.4.3 Welfare Monotonicity for Large Committee
In the previous section, we showed that the expected utility may not be
increasing in n. However, it turns out that the decreasing expected utility
occurs only in small committees. We can show that the expected utility is
increasing for suciently large n.
First, we show that the cuto point goes to 1=2 as n goes to innity.
Lemma 3.5. t ! 1=2 as n!1.
Proof. The indierence condition (3.5) is arranged as follows.
Pr(A)
Pr(B)
Pr(sjA; t)
Pr(sjB; t)

A(1  A)
(1  B)B
n
=
u(BjA)
u(AjB) (3.7)
For this equation to hold for all n, a limit of the ratio
A(1  A)
(1  B)B (3.8)
must exist and it must be 1. This implies that t goes to 1=2.
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The intuition is as follows. The ratio (3.8) is the likelihood ratio of the
voting split among two voters in state w = A and state w = B. The ratio of
probabilities that he is pivotal given the states is the likelihood ratio to the
power of n. In the sequence of equilibria as n goes to innity, the likelihood
ratio must go to one. This implies that t must go to 1=2.
In the next theorem, we show that the interval [(n); (n)] is monotonic
in n and covers the whole range of  for suciently large n.
Theorem 3.3. (n) is decreasing in n and (n) is increasing in n. Moreover,
(n) goes to 0 and (n) goes to innity as n goes to innity.
Proof. First, we show that  is decreasing in n. Recall that  is dened as a
unique  for which B = 1=2. Then, by Lemma 3.4, it must be that  < 1.
By Lemma 3.3, this implies that s = b. Recall from Lemma 3.2 that t is
decreasing in n. When s = b, this means that B is increasing in n. On the
other hand, by Lemma 3.4, B is increasing in . This implies that (n) is
decreasing in n.
Second, we show that (n) goes to 0 as n goes to innity. Take any  > 0.
By Lemma 3.5, B goes to E[t] > 1=2. Therefore, when we take  = , there
exists N such that B(n; ) > 1=2 for any n  N . By Lemma 3.4, (n) < 
holds for any n  N . Therefore, (n) goes to 0 as n goes to innity.
Similarly, (n) is increasing in n and goes to innity as n goes to innity.
Theorem 3.3 guarantees that, for any , there exists n such that  2
[(n); (n)] for n  n. Then, together with Theorem 3.2, the expected
utility is increasing for suciently large n. Formally, the following statement
holds.
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Corollary 3.1. There exists n such that E2n+1[u] < E2n0+1[u] holds for any
n0 > n  n.
3.4.4 Optimal Committee Design
We consider the problem of optimal committee design. Suppose there
are N committee member candidates. The committee design problem is to
choose the number n of committee members so as to maximize the expected
utility from the decision by the committee. Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.4
establishes the following result.
Proposition 3.2 (optimal committee design). There exist N such that the
optimal committee size is n = N for any N  N.
Proof. Take n in Corollary 1. Then, consider maxnn E2n+1[u]. By Theo-
rem 3.4, there exist N such that E2N+1[u] > maxnn E2n+1[u]. Note that
N > n by denition. Take anyN  N. Then, E2N+1[u] > maxN>n>n E2n+1[u]
by Corollary 1, because N > n. Hence, E2N+1[u] > maxn<N E2n+1[u].
3.5 Limit CJT under Strategic Voting
In this section, we discuss the convergence of cuto point in the cuto
strategy and we prove that the limit property of the correct decision in the
CJT holds under strategic voting.
Lemma 3.5 states that as n goes to innity, the cuto point t converges
to 1=2. This means that in the limit, a voter who receives signal s = a votes
for A and a voter who receives signal s = b votes for B, that is, a voter votes
in such a way that his vote conveys the information about his signal directly.
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This voting behavior is called informative voting. Under the informative
voting according to an informative signal, the voting probabilities A and
B are larger than 1=2, so that the assumption of CJT is satised. However,
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that the informative voting may not
constitute equilibrium. Nevertheless, our result shows that the informative
voting is an equilibrium in the limit. To be explicit, the following holds.
Proposition 3.3 (Informative voting). The voting behavior in equilibrium
converges to informative voting when n!1.
Proposition 3.3 implies that the probabilities that the committee chooses
the better alternative given the state go to 1 as n goes to innity.
Theorem 3.4 (Limit CJT under strategic voting). Pr(d = AjA) ! 1 and
Pr(d = BjB)! 1 as n!1.
Proof. In the limit, A = B = E[t] > 1=2. Then we can apply the law of
large numbers.
Theorem 3.4 implies that the expected utility E2n+1[u] goes to 0 as n goes
to innity.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we studied the symmetric responsive equilibrium in the
Bayesian voting game. We focused on the issue of how the welfare from
the committee decision depends on the number of committee members. We
showed that when the number of committee members is large enough, the
welfare is increased monotonically by adding other members to the com-
mittee. This implies that if there are suciently many committee member
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candidates, the optimal committee design is that everyone participates in the
committee.
We proved the welfare monotonicity result for the committee whose mem-
bers are homogenous in their distributions of the degree of information preci-
sion. The distribution is interpreted as describing the uncertainty about the
degree of information precision which is realized for a member. It is often
the case in many committee decisions that the uncertainty is dierent among
the members. For example, an expert of a decision problem is more likely to
have a higher degree of information precision than a person who is not an
expert. For these committee decisions, the committee design becomes a more
complex problem of how to organize the committee by choosing from candi-
dates who are heterogeneous in their distributions of information precision.
This is an important issue that should be studied in the future research.
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2n + 1  A B Pr(d = Ajw = A) Pr(d = Bjw = B) E2n+1[u]
1 0 0.1 1 0.1 1 -0.1125
3 0.047283802 0.142555422 0.957444578 0.055172108 0.994721241 -0.120083021
5 0.116960143 0.205264128 0.894735872 0.06204271 0.990100299 -0.120957049
7 0.174594176 0.257134758 0.842865242 0.07732943 0.985702529 -0.120695373
9 0.220593492 0.298534143 0.801465857 0.097022674 0.98101715 -0.119990734
11 0.257163855 0.331447469 0.768552531 0.119272119 0.976178822 -0.119023927
13 0.286417882 0.357776094 0.742223906 0.14281619 0.971392611 -0.117875747
15 0.310068208 0.379061387 0.720938613 0.166774964 0.966818828 -0.116596069
17 0.329424446 0.396482002 0.703517998 0.190563787 0.962557034 -0.115220639
19 0.345466122 0.410919509 0.689080491 0.213816746 0.958656953 -0.113776549
21 0.358922205 0.423029985 0.676970015 0.23632065 0.955133867 -0.112284719
23 0.370337272 0.433303545 0.666696455 0.257964171 0.951981581 -0.110761386
25 0.380121555 0.442109399 0.657890601 0.278701607 0.949181658 -0.109219177
27 0.388587362 0.449728626 0.650271374 0.298528244 0.946709485 -0.107667913
29 0.395975182 0.456377664 0.643622336 0.317464072 0.944538043 -0.106115225
31 0.402472349 0.462225114 0.637774886 0.335543252 0.942640138 -0.104567042
33 0.408226448 0.467403804 0.632596196 0.352807372 0.940989648 -0.10302796
35 0.413355013 0.472019511 0.627980489 0.369301223 0.939562174 -0.101501532
37 0.417952599 0.476157339 0.623842661 0.385070174 0.938335307 -0.099990488
39 0.422096015 0.479886413 0.620113587 0.400158611 0.937288694 -0.098496913
41 0.425848209 0.483263388 0.616736612 0.414609027 0.936403977 -0.09702238
43 0.429261206 0.486335086 0.613664914 0.428461553 0.935664665 -0.095568056
45 0.432378341 0.489140507 0.610859493 0.44175375 0.935055988 -0.094134786
47 0.435235969 0.491712372 0.608287628 0.454520565 0.934564729 -0.092723156
49 0.437864802 0.494078322 0.605921678 0.466794395 0.934179068 -0.09133355
51 0.440290946 0.496261851 0.603738149 0.478605199 0.933888438 -0.089966186
53 0.442536724 0.498283051 0.601716949 0.489980654 0.933683377 -0.088621152
55 0.444621339 0.500159205 0.599840795 0.500946349 0.933555398 -0.087298432
57 0.446561388 0.501905249 0.598094751 0.511525905 0.933496895 -0.085997926
59 0.448371196 0.503534076 0.596465924 0.521740645 0.9335012 -0.08471947
61 0.450063696 0.505057326 0.594942674 0.531612701 0.933561515 -0.083462844
Table 3.1: expected utility in the discrete model
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Chapter 4
Strategic Voting and Condorcet
Jury Theorem under
Uncertainty about Player's
Information Precision with
Heterogeneity in Distributions
of Information Precision (I)
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze a heterogenous model, that is, the diverse
judgments of people are realized by dierent probability distributions. We
introduce a heterogeneity as follows. We assume that most of the members
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receive their degrees of information precision according to a particular dis-
tribution and the remaining minority of members receive their degrees of
information precision according to a dierent distribution. As an extreme
case, we analyzed the case in which the only one member is minority. That
is, 2n members receive their degrees of information precision according to
a particular distribution and one member receives his degree of information
precision according to a dierent distribution.
We study the distribution-wise symmetric equilibrium in this Bayesian
voting game. In this class of equilibrium, there may exist an asymmetric
equilibrium in which the equilibrium behavior for the players in the majority
group is not identical to the equilibrium behavior for the minority player.
Our main result is the following. In spite of the possibility of the asym-
metric equilibrium, when the degree of heterogeneity is small, that is, only
one-member has dierent distribution, voting behavior of all the members
must converge to informative voting under simple majority rule. This result
coincides with the case of the unique distribution of the degree of informa-
tion precision. In the limit, informative voting behavior implies that the CJT
holds.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we explain our model.
In Section 3, we show that the voting behavior in the equilibrium is charac-
terized by a cuto strategy. In Section 4, we show that the voting behavior
in the equilibrium converges to informative voting.
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4.2 Model
The voting game that we analyze in this chapter is similar to the model
in Chapter 3. We introduce the heterogeneity as follows. The degree of infor-
mation precision ti is distributed on [1=2; 1] = T with a full support density.
For the 2n members, the degree of information precision ti is distributed
according to a full support density f . For the only one member, the degree
of information precision ti is distributed according to a full support density
g. Thus, each member has three kinds of private information, the signal si,
the degree of information precision ti, and his distribution of the information
precision.1
Moreover, to simplify the analysis, we consider following utility function.
We assume that the utility from choosing the better alternative is the same
between state A and state B and and normalized to 1. We also assume that
the utility from choosing the worse alternative is the same between state A
and state B and and normalized to 0. Then, the utility function is as follows;
u(d = Ajw = A) = u(d = Bjw = B) = 1
and
u(d = Bjw = A) = u(d = Ajw = B) = 0:
Then, the timing of the game is as follows. A state w 2 fA;Bg is realized
with probability Pr(w). We denote Pr(B) = q > 1=2. Each committee
member i is endowed with his information precision ti 2 [1=2; 1] according
to the densities f or g. Then, each committee member i receives a signal
1The result of this chapter also holds even if the probability distribution of ti is common
knowledge.
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si 2 fa; bg. Then, the committee members vote for alternative A or B
simultaneously. A decision d 2 fA;Bg is made by the simple majority rule.
The members receive utilities depending on the decision made and the state
realized.
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
A committee member has private information (s; t) 2 S  T . A (pure)
strategy of member i is a function mi : S  T  ff; gg ! fA;Bg. We
analyze the distribution-wise symmetric equilibrium, in which all the f -type
members use the same strategy. Moreover, we consider strategies such that
the f -type member changes his vote according to his information. We call
them responsive strategies. They are formally dened as follows.
Denition 4.1 (responsive strategy). The strategy is responsive if there exist
(s; t) and (s0; t0) such that mi(s; t) 6= mi(s0; t0) and the sets f(s; t)jmi(s; t) =
Ag and f(s; t)jmi(s; t) = Bg have positive measures.
The responsive strategy for the f -type implies that the voting probabil-
ities for better alternatives are 0 < Pr(mi = Ajw = A; f);Pr(mi = Bjw =
B; f) < 1.
We consider the best response to responsive strategies. The condition by
which a voter who has private information (s; t) weakly prefers voting for A
to voting for B is that the expected utility from voting for A is more than
or equal to the expected utility from voting for B. That is,
Pr(w = Ajsi; ti; piv; f)
Pr(w = Bjsi; ti; piv; f)  1
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for the f -type, and
Pr(w = Ajsi; ti; piv; g)
Pr(w = Bjsi; ti; piv; g)  1
for the g-type. In the left-hand side of these conditions, piv means that the
voter is pivotal; n members vote for A and n members vote for B. When
the member i is pivotal, if he votes for A(B) then the committee decision
is A(B). When the member i is not pivotal, his vote does not change the
committee decision. Thus, the optimality of his voting behavior matters
only when he is pivotal. Then, he chooses his vote depending on his private
information (si; ti; ) and information that he is pivotal. By the Bayes rule,
these conditions are arranged to
Pr(w = Ajsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(w = Bjsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(pivjw = A; f)
Pr(pivjw = B; f)  1
and
Pr(w = Ajsg; tg; g)
Pr(w = Bjsg; tg; g)
Pr(pivjw = A; g)
Pr(pivjw = B; g)  1:
Then, the indierence conditions for f -type and g-type are
Pr(w = Ajsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(w = Bjsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(pivjw = A; f)
Pr(pivjw = B; f) = 1 (4.1)
and
Pr(w = Ajsg; tg; g)
Pr(w = Bjsg; tg; g)
Pr(pivjw = A; g)
Pr(pivjw = B; g) = 1: (4.2)
Given the responsive strategy, the ratio of probabilities that he is pivotal
has nite value. The rst term (the ratio of posterior probabilities given his
private information) of these conditions is
Pr(w = Ajs; t; )
Pr(w = Bjs; t; ) =
8<: 1 qq t1 t if s = a1 q
q
1 t
t
if s = b
:
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For s = a, this ratio is increasing in t and goes to innity as t goes to 1. For
s = b, this ratio is decreasing in t and goes to 0 as t goes to 1. This implies
that the best response is a cuto strategy if the other f -type members use
responsive strategies.
Denition 4.2 (cuto strategy). A strategy is a cuto strategy if there exists
a cuto point (s; t) such that mi(s; t) = A if and only if Pr(w = Ajs; t) 
Pr(w = Ajs; t).
Theorem 4.1. A best response to responsive strategies must be a cuto strat-
egy.
4.4 Limit Theorem
4.4.1 Limit Theorem on Voting Behavior
In this section, we show that the equilibrium cuto points (sf ; t

f ) and
(sg; t

g) converge to 1=2 as n goes to innity. This means that in the limit,
a voter who receives signal s = a votes for A and a voter who receives
signal s = b votes for B, that is, a voter votes in such a way that his vote
conveys the information about his signal directly. This voting behavior is
called informative voting.
Let us denote that the voting probabilities for better alternatives by the
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cuto points (sf ; t

f ) and (s

g; t

g) as
A;f = Pr(m = Ajsf ; tf ; f)
B;f = Pr(m = Bjsf ; tf ; f)
A;g = Pr(m = Ajsg; tg; g)
B;g = Pr(m = Bjsg; tg; g):
These probabilities are
A;f =
Z 1
tf
tf(t)dt
B;f = 1 
Z 1
tf
(1  t)f(t)dt
A;g =
Z 1
tg
tf(t)dt
B;g = 1 
Z 1
tg
(1  t)f(t)dt
for the case of sf = a and s

g = a, and
A;f = 1 
Z 1
tf
(1  t)f(t)dt
B;f =
Z 1
tf
tf(t)dt
A;g = 1 
Z 1
tg
(1  t)f(t)dt
B;g =
Z 1
tg
tf(t)dt
for the case of sf = b and s

g = b. By Theorem 4.1, the indierence conditions
are rearranged to
Pr(w = Ajsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(w = Bjsf ; tf ; f)
"
nA;f (1  A;f )n 1(1  A;g)
 
2n 1
n

+ n 1A;f (1  A;f )nA;g
 
2n 1
n 1

nB;f (1  B;f )n 1(1  B;g)
 
2n 1
n

+ n 1B;f (1  B;f )nB;g
 
2n 1
n 1
# = 1
(4.3)
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or
Pr(w = Ajsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(w = Bjsf ; tf ; f)

A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f )
n 1 
A;f (1  A;g) + (1  A;f )A;g
B;f (1  B;g) + (1  B;f )B;g

= 1
(4.4)
for f -type, and
Pr(w = Ajsg; tg; g)
Pr(w = Bjsg; tg; g)

A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f )
n
= 1 (4.5)
for g-type.
First, we show that the cuto point of f -type goes to 1=2 as n goes to
innity.
Lemma 4.1. tf ! 1=2 as n!1.
Proof. Suppose that tf does not converge to 1=2. Since T is compact, we
can take a convergent subsequence with limit greater than 1=2. There exists
 > 0 such that for suciently large n, it holds that
A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f ) > 1 + :
This implies 
A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f )
n
!1:
This is a contradiction. Then, it must hold
lim
n!1
A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f ) = 1:
This implies that tf goes to 1=2.
Second, we show that the cuto point of g-type also goes to 1=2 as n goes
to innity.
Lemma 4.2. tg ! 1=2 as n!1.
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Proof. By the indierence condition of g-type,
Pr(w = Ajsg; tg; g)
Pr(w = Bjsg; tg; g)

A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f )

= 1=

A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f )
n 1
:
Then, the indierence condition of f -type is
Pr(w = Ajsf ; tf ; f)
Pr(w = Bjsf ; tf ; f)

A;f (1  A;g) + (1  A;f )A;g
B;f (1  B;g) + (1  B;f )B;g

=
Pr(w = Ajsg; tg; g)
Pr(w = Bjsg; tg; g)

A;f (1  A;f )
B;f (1  B;f )

:
As tf ! 1=2, it must be
1  q
q

Ef [t](1  A;g) + (1  Ef [t])A;g
Ef [t](1  B;g) + (1  Ef [t])B;g

=
Pr(w = Ajsg; tg; g)
Pr(w = Bjsg; tg; g) :
This equation holds for tg = 1=2.
By Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, Theorem 4.2 holds.
Theorem 4.2. The voting behavior in equilibrium converges to informative
voting when n!1.
4.4.2 Limit CJT
Under the informative voting according to an informative signal, the vot-
ing probabilities A;f ; B;f ; A;g and B;g are larger than 1=2. Therefore, the
Limit CJT holds.
Proposition 4.1 (Limit CJT). Both of Pr(d = Ajw = A) and Pr(d = Bjw =
B) go to one.
This proposition implies that even if there exists a minority group of
people who receive their degrees of information precision according to dif-
ferent distribution than the majority of people, the voting by all the people
including the minority leads to a correct decision with almost probability
one. Thus, the eciency of the simple majority rule is robust with respect
to heterogeneity of people as long as the heterogeneity is limited.
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Chapter 5
Strategic Voting and Condorcet
Jury Theorem under
Uncertainty about Player's
Information Precision with
Heterogeneity in Distributions
of Information Precision (II)
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we analyze another heterogenous model. We introduce
a heterogeneity as follows. We assume that the population consist of two
major groups. The members in one group receive their degrees of information
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precision according to a particular distribution. The members in the other
group receive their degrees of information precision according to a dierent
distribution. We consider a case in which two groups are similar size. As an
extreme case, one group is composed of n+ 1 members and the other group
is composed of n members. In this case, the population ratio is 1/2.
We study the eciency of decisions in the distribution-wise symmetric
equilibrium when the committee size becomes large. Our main result is the
following. First, the asymmetric equilibrium does not converge to informa-
tive equilibrium when the committee size becomes large. Second, however,
the voting probabilities that the committee chooses the better alternatives
converge to one.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we explain our model.
In Section 3, we study the symmetric equilibrium. In Section 4, we show
that there exists an asymmetric equilibrium. In Section 5, we show the limit
properties of the asymmetric equilibrium.
5.2 Model
The voting game that we analyzed in this chapter is similar to the model
in Chapter 4. We introduce a heterogeneity as follows. The degree of infor-
mation precision ti is distributed on [1=2; 1] = T . For the n+1 members, the
degree of information precision is distributed uniformly, that is, its density
f is f(ti) = 2. For the other n members, the degree of information preci-
sion is distributed according to a particular discrete distribution g such that
Pr(ti = 1) = Pr(ti = 1=2) = 1=2. Thus, each member has three kinds of
private information, the signal si, the degree of information precision ti, and
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his distribution of the degree of information precision.
The utility function is the same in Chapter 4;
u(d = Ajw = A) = u(d = Bjw = B) = 1
and
u(d = Bjw = A) = u(d = Ajw = B) = 0:
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the prior probability satises
Pr(w = A) = Pr(w = B). Then, the timing of the game is as follows. A
state w 2 fA;Bg is realized with the same probability between A and B, that
is, Pr(w = A) = Pr(w = B) = 1=2. Each committee member i is endowed
with his information precision ti 2 [1=2; 1] according to the distribution f or
g. Then, each committee member i receives a signal si 2 fa; bg. Then, the
committee members vote for alternative A or B simultaneously. A decision
d 2 fA;Bg is made by the simple majority rule. The members receive
utilities depending on the decision made and the state realized.
5.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
We analyze the distribution-wise symmetric equilibrium, in which all the
f -type members use the same strategy and all the g-type members use the
same strategy. A committee member has private information (s; t) 2 S  T .
Then, a strategy of member i who is f -type is a functionmi : ST ! fA;Bg.
Moreover, we consider strategies such that the f -type member changes his
vote according to his information. We call them responsive strategies. They
are formally dened as follows.
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Denition 5.1 (responsive strategy). The strategy is responsive if there exist
(s; t) and (s0; t0) such that mi(s; t) 6= mi(s0; t0) and the sets f(s; t)jmi(s; t) =
Ag and f(s; t)jmi(s; t) = Bg have positive measures.
The responsive strategy for the f -type implies that the voting probabil-
ities for better alternatives are 0 < Pr(mi = Ajw = A; f);Pr(mi = Bjw =
B; f) < 1.
Moreover, we restrict the strategy of f -type. We assume that the f -type
members use cuto strategy.
Denition 5.2 (cuto strategy). A strategy is a cuto strategy if there exists
a cuto point (s; t) such that mi(s; t) = A if and only if Pr(w = Ajs; t) 
Pr(w = Ajs; t).
On the other hand, a strategy of member i who is g-type is as follows.
When ti = 1, his optimal voting behavior is that he votes for A if and only if
he receives si = a. When ti = 1=2, his signal has no information. Then, we
consider a mixed action of g-type with ti = 1=2, that is, he votes for A with
probability  when ti = 1=2.
The indierence condition of f -type is
Pr(w = Ajsf ; tf ; f; piv)
Pr(w = Bjsf ; tf ; f; piv) = 1:
In the left-hand side of the indierence condition, piv means that he is pivotal.
This is arranged to
Pr(w = Ajs; t)
Pr(w = Bjs; t)
Pr(pivjw = A; f)
Pr(pivjw = B; f) = 1: (5.1)
Similarly, the indierence condition of g-type with ti = 1=2 is
Pr(pivjw = A; g)
Pr(pivjw = B; g) = 1: (5.2)
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If the left-hand side of this equation is larger than one, he votes for A with
 = 1.
Let (A;f ; B;f ) denote the voting probabilities of f -type for better alterna-
tives in each states. Similarly, let (A;g; B;g) denote the voting probabilities
of g-type for better alternatives in each states. With cuto point (sf ; t

f ) and
, these probabilities are
A;f =
Z 1
t
tf(t)dt
B;f = 1 
Z 1
t
(1  t)f(t)dt
A;g =
1
2
+
1
2

B;g =
1
2
+
1
2
(1  )
for sf = a. Then, the indierence conditions of f -type and g-type are rear-
ranged to
t
1  t
Pn
k=0(A;f )
k(1  A;f )n k(A;g)n k(1  A;f )k
 
n
k
 
n
k
Pn
k=0(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(B;g)n k(1  B;g)k
 
n
k
 
n
k
 = 1 (5.3)
andPn
k=1(A;f )
k(1  A;f )n+1 k(A;g)n k(1  A;f )k 1
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1
Pn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n+1 k(B;g)n k(1  B;g)k 1
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1
 = 1: (5.4)
5.3.1 Informative Voting and Symmetric Equilibrium
In this section, we show that there exists an informative voting equilib-
rium; every 2n+ 1 members use informative voting strategy.
Denition 5.3 (informative voting). A voting strategy is informative voting
if the voter votes for A when his signal is si = a and votes for B when his
signal is si = b.
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Proposition 5.1 (informative voting equilibrium). For any n, there exists
an equilibrium in which both of f -type and g-type use informative voting
strategy.
Proof. Consider informative voting strategy, that is, t = 1=2 and  = 1=2.
Under the informative voting, the voting probabilities for better alternatives
are
A;f = B;f = A;g = B;g = 3=4:
The indierence condition of f -type is
t
1  t
 3
4
1
4
3
4
1
4
n Pn
k=0
 
n
k
 
n
k
Pn
k=0
 
n
k
 
n
k
 = 1:
This means that the presumed cuto t = 1=2 is a cuto under best response
to other players' strategies t = 1=2 and  = 1=2.
The indierence condition of g-type is 3
4
1
4
3
4
1
4
n Pn
k=1
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1
Pn
k=1
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1
 = 1:
This means that the presumed mixed strategy  = 1=2 is a best response for
ti = 1=2 of g-type against other players' strategies t
 = 1=2 and  = 1=2.
5.4 Asymmetric Equilibrium
In the previous section, we show that there exists a \symmetric" equi-
librium; both of f -type and g-type use informative voting strategy. In this
section, we show that there exists an \asymmetric" equilibrium; f -type's vot-
ing behavior is biased for B and g-type's voting behavior is biased for A. We
also show that the Limit Condorcet jury theorem holds for the asymmetric
equilibrium.
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5.4.1 Existence of Asymmetric Equilibrium
We show that there exists an \asymmetric" equilibrium, in which s =
a; t > 1=2 and  = 1 are satised. In this equilibrium, f -type's voting
behavior is biased for B and g-type's voting behavior is biased for A. The
indierence condition (5:3) for f -type of this equilibrium is reduced to
t
1  t
(1  A;f )nPn
k=0(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k
 = 1: (5.5)
The condition for  = 1 of g-type is
(A;f )(1  A;f )n
 
n+1
1
Pn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n+1 k(1=2)n 1
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1
  1: (5.6)
In contrast with the equation (5:4), the inequality (5:6) accommodates the
case in which the optimal behavior for ti = 1=2 of g-type becomes a corner
solution of  over the interval [0; 1].
We show that there exists t which satises these conditions.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an equilibrium with s = a; t > 1=2 and  = 1.
Moreover, t is a unique cuto.
Proof. First, we show that there exists t. The indierence condition (5:5)
of f -type is rearranged to
t
1  t
1Pn
k=0(
B;f
1 A;f )
k(
1 B;f
1 A;f )
n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k
 = 1: (5.7)
Since s = a,
B;f
1  A;f =
1  (1  t)2
t2
=
t(2  t)
t2
=
(2  t)
t
and
1  B;f
1  A;f =
(1  t)2
t2
=

1  t
t
2
:
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Then the second term of (5:7) is increasing in t. Hence, the left-hand side
of (5:7) is increasing in t. For t = 1, the voting probabilities for the better
alternatives are A;f = 0 and B;f = 1. The ratio of the probabilities that he
is pivotal is
1Pn
k=0(
B;f
1 A;f )
k(
1 B;f
1 A;f )
n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k

=
1
(1=2)n
= 2n:
Then, the left-hand side of (5:7) is larger than one for suciently large t.
On the other hand, for t = 1=2, the left-hand side of (5:7) is
Pr(pivjw = A; f)
Pr(pivjw = B; f) =
1Pn
k=0(3)
k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k

<
1Pn
k=0(1=2)
n
 
n
k
 
n
k

=
2nPn
k=0(
 
n
k

)2
=
2n 
2n
n

=
2nn!
(2n)!=n!
=
Qn 1
l=0 2(n  l)Qn 1
l=0 (2n  l)
 1:
This implies that there exists an unique t such that the condition of f -type
is satised.
Second, we show that t also satises the condition of g-type. The left-
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hand side of (5:6) is rearranged to
(A;f )(1  A;f )n
 
n+1
1
Pn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n+1 k(1=2)n 1
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1

=
1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
(1  A;f )n
 
n+1
1
Pn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n
 
n+1
k
 
n 1
k 1

=
1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
(1  A;f )n
 
n+1
1
Pn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n[ n+1n+1 k kn ]
 
n
k
 
n
k

 1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
(1  A;f )n
 
n+1
1
Pn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n[n+ 1]
 
n
k
 
n
k

=
1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
(1  A;f )nPn
k=1(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k

 1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
(1  A;f )nPn
k=0(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k
 :
By the condition (5:5) of f -type,
1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
(1  A;f )nPn
k=0(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k

=
1
2
A;f
(1  B;f )
1  t
t
=
1
2
1  t2
(1  t)2
1  t
t
=
1 + t
2t
 1:
Then, (5:6) also holds.
5.4.2 Limit Property of Asymmetric Equilibrium
In this section, we show that the Condorcet jury theorem holds in the
asymmetric equilibrium. We consider the asymmetric equilibrium which we
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studied in the previous section. We show that both of the probabilities that
the committee chooses better alternatives (Pr(d = Ajw = A) and Pr(d =
Bjw = B)) in this asymmetric equilibrium go to one as n goes to innity.
First, we consider the case of w = B. In the asymmetric equilibrium,
the f -type member uses cuto strategy with s = a and the g-type member
votes for A when his degree of information precision is t = 1=2 and votes for
B when his degree of information precision is t = 1. Then, the probability
that the f -type member votes for the better alternative B is larger than 1=2,
and the probability that the g-type member votes for the better alternative
B is equal to 1=2. The assumption of the classical CJT is satised. Then,
by the law of large numbers, the CJT holds.
Second, we consider the case of w = A. For w = A, the g-type member
votes for A with probability one since  = 1. Then, the decision of the
committee is B if and only if every n+1 f -type member votes for B. Then,
the Condorcet jury theorem holds if
lim
n!1
t < 1: (5.8)
Lemma 5.1 provides a sucient condition for (5.8).
Lemma 5.1. There exist t such that for any t 2 (t; 1), limn!1(t; n) > 1
where (t; n) = Pr(pivjw=A;f)
Pr(pivjw=B;f) with  = 1.
Proof. We prove Lemma 5.1 in four steps.
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Step 1 The ratio of the probabilities that the voter is pivotal is
(t; n) =
(1  A;f )nPn
k=0(B;f )
k(1  B;f )n k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k

=
(1  A;f )nPn
k=0(B;f )
n k(1  B;f )k(1=2)n
 
n
k
 
n
k

=
"p
2(1  A;f )
B;f
#n
1Pn
k=0
h
1 B;f
B;f
ik
(1=
p
2)n
 
n
k
2 :
For suciently large t, the rst term satises
p
2(1  A;f )
B;f
=
p
2t2
t(2  t) > 1:
Then, we show
lim
n!1
1Pn
k=0
h
1 B;f
B;f
ik
(1=
p
2)n
 
n
k
2 6= 0
for suciently large t. This condition holds if
lim
n!1
Pn+1
k=0
h
1 B;f
B;f
ik
(1=
p
2)n+1
 
n+1
k
2
Pn
k=0
h
1 B;f
B;f
ik
(1=
p
2)n
 
n
k
2 < 1
for suciently large t. Let z =
1 B;f
B;f
, this condition is rearranged to
lim
n!1
Pn+1
k=0(1=
p
2)
 
n+1
k
2
zkPn
k=0
 
n
k
2
zk
< 1
for suciently small z.
Step 2 We approximate
lim
n!1
Pn+1
k=0(1=
p
2)
 
n+1
k
2
zkPn
k=0
 
n
k
2
zk
: (5.9)
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Step 2-1 We approximate the denominator of (5.9) as following. Here,
we dene a step function n as follows;
n(x) =
8<:
 
n
k
2
zk for k
n
 x < k+1
n
; k = 0; :::; n
0 otherwise.
By the denition of n, Z k+1
n
k
n
n(x)dx =
1
n

n
k
2
zk
and
nX
k=0
Z k+1
n
k
n
n(x)dx =
1
n
nX
k=0

n
k
2
zk:
Let (x) = limn n(x), we getZ 1
0
(x)dx = lim
n!1
1
n
nX
k=0

n
k
2
zk:
We apply the Stirling's approximation1 to approximate ,
(x) = lim
n!1
n(x)
= lim
n!1

n
k
2
zk
 lim
n!1

n
xn
2
zxn
=

n!
(xn)!((1  x)n)!
2
zxn

 p
2n(n
e
)np
2xn(xn
e
)xn
p
2(1  x)n( (1 x)n
e
)(1 x)n
!2
zxn
=
1
n
1
2x(1  x)

zx
x2x(1  x)2(1 x)
n
:
1Stirling's approximation:
n! 
p
2n(
n
e
)n
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Hence, we approximate the denominator of (5.9) as
lim
n!1
nX
k=0

n
k
2
zk 
Z 1
0
1
2x(1  x)

zx
x2x(1  x)2(1 x)
n
dx:
Step 2-2 Similarly, we approximate the numerator of (5.9)
lim
n!1
n+1X
k=0

n+ 1
k
2
zk = lim
n!1
n+1X
k=0

n+ 1
n+ 1  k
2
n
k
2
zk
= lim
n!1
n+1X
k=0
 
1
1  k
n+1
!2
n
k
2
zk
= lim
n!1
n+1X
k=0
 
1
1  k
n
n
n+1
!2
n
k
2
zk

Z 1
0

1
1  x
2
1
2x(1  x)

zx
x2x(1  x)2(1 x)
n
dx:
Step 2-3 From Step 2-1 and Step 2-2, we approximate (5.9) as
lim
n!1
Pn+1
k=0(1=
p
2)
 
n+1
k
2
zkPn
k=0
 
n
k
2
zk

R 1
0
1p
2
 
1
1 x
2 1
2x(1 x)

zx
x2x(1 x)2(1 x)
n
dxR 1
0
1
2x(1 x)

zx
x2x(1 x)2(1 x)
n
dx
:
(5.10)
Step 3 We state some properties of the right-hand side of (5.10).
Step3-1 We dene
(x) =
1p
2

1
1  x
2
: (5.11)
It is easy to check that (x) is increasing in x. Moreover, (x) = 1=
p
2 at
x = 0 and (x)!1 as x! 1. Then, (x)  1 if and only if
x  1 

1p
2
2
(< 1): (5.12)
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Step3-2 We dene
 (x; z) =
zx
x2x(1  x)2(1 x) : (5.13)
 (x; z) is increasing in x for x <
p
z
1 pz and decreasing in x for x >
p
z
1 pz .
Moreover,  (x; z) ! 1 as x ! 0 and  (x; z) ! z as x ! 1. Then, there
exists xz 2 (0; 1) such that  (xz; z) = 1 where xz >
p
z
1 pz . Note that x

z is
strictly increasin in z.
Step4 We show that threr exist z such that
lim
n!1
Pn+1
k=0(1=
p
2)
 
n+1
k
2
zkPn
k=0
 
n
k
2
zk
< 1
for any z 2 (0; z).
We dene z as z which satises xz = 1   (1=
p
2)2 Then,  (x; z) < 1 for
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x where x > xz. Note that x

z < x

z since z < z. Then,
lim
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1p
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1
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= 1:
Lemma 5.1 implies (5.8), and the Condorcet jury theorem holds in the
asymmetric equilibrium.
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Theorem 5.2 (CJT in the asymmetric equilibrium). The Condorcet jury
theorem holds.
It may hold that the asymmetric equilibrium remains when the sizes of
two groups are the same. We showed that the CJT holds in the asymmetric
equilibrium for particular distributions. The implication of this result is
that the CJT is robust for the heterogeneity of distributions. However, the
generality of this result will be studied in the future research.
Appendix
An Alternative Proof of Lemma 5.1
In this appendix, we provide an alternative proof of Lemma 5.1. The
probability that some members of f -type vote for A and the other members
of f -type vote for B on the state w = A has binomial distribution with
parameter n and A since the voting probabilities for each members are
independent. Let random variable YA;f denote the numbers which f -type
members vote for A on the state w = A. For large n, we apply the central
limit theorem, YA;f is asymptotically distributed normal distribution with
mean nA;f and variance nA;f (1   A;f ). Then, YA;f d N(A;f ; A;f (1  
A;f )=n) where YA;f = YA;f=n. On the other hand, let random variable YB;f
denote the numbers which f -type members vote for A on the state w = B
and YB;f=n
d N(1   B;f ; B;f (1   B;f )=n). Similarly, YA;g and YB;g are
dened. Note that Y;f and Y;g are independent since (si; ti) and (sj; tj) are
independent given the state.
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We dene ZA and ZB as
ZA = YA;f + YA;g (5.14)
and
ZB = YB;f + YB;g: (5.15)
For suciently large n,
ZA
d N(A;f + B;f ; A;f (1  A;f ) + A;g(1  A;g)
n
)
and
ZB
d N(2  B;f   B;g; B;f (1  B;f ) + B;g(1  B;g)
n
):
Then, the probability density function of ZA is
fA(zA) =
1
p
2
q
A;f (1 A;f )+A;g(1 A;g)
n
exp
(
 1
2
(zA   A;f   A;g)2
A;f (1 A;f )+A;g(1 A;g)
n
)
:
Similarly, the probability density function of ZB is
fB(zB) =
1
p
2
q
B;f (1 B;f )+B;g(1 B;g)
n
exp
(
 1
2
(zB   2 + B;f + B;g)2
B;f (1 B;f )+B;g(1 B;g)
n
)
:
The ratio of the densities at zA = zB = 1 is
L(t) =
s
B;f (1  B;f ) + B;g(1  B;g)
A;f (1  A;f ) + A;g(1  A;g)
 exp

 n
2

(1  A;f   A;g)2
A;f (1  A;f ) + A;g(1  A;g)  
(1  B;f   B;g)2
B;f (1  B;f ) + B;g(1  B;g)

:
This ratio goes to innity if
(1  A;f   A;g)2
A;f (1  A;f ) + A;g(1  A;g)  
(1  B;f   B;g)2
B;f (1  B;f ) + B;g(1  B;g) < 0:
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We dene a function
l(t) =
(1  A;f   A;g)2
A;f (1  A;f ) + A;g(1  A;g)  
(1  B;f   B;g)2
B;f (1  B;f ) + B;g(1  B;g) :
We consider the asymmetric equilibrium, then
A;f = 1  t2
B;f = 1  (1  t)2
A;g = 1
B;g = 1=2:
The function is
l(t) =
1  t2
t2
  ((1  t)
2   1=2)2
(1  (1  t)2)(1  t)2 + 1=4
=
1  t2
t2
  (1  t)
4   (1  t)2 + 1=4
 (1  t)4 + (1  t)2 + 1=4
and it is easy to check that l(1) < 0. By the continuity of t, there exists
t < 1 such that l(t) < 0 for any t > t. Then, Lemma 5.1 holds.
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